Below is the judgment given by Doncaster Crown Court on 11 November 2010 refusing the appeal of Paul Chambers of his conviction and sentence.
On the 10th May 2010, the Appellant, Paul Chambers, a 27 year old, working in the finance industry, appeared before District Judge Bennett at Doncaster Magistrates’ Court and was convicted of an offence of sending, by means of a public electronic communications network, a message that was grossly offensive, or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing character contrary to Section 1271(A) and (3) of the Communications Act 2003.
He appeals against that conviction by virtue of a Notice of Appeal dated the 18th May 2010. At the conclusion of the Respondent’s case, the Appellant made submissions that the case should proceed no further.
This morning, we have given our reasons for rejecting those submissions, having concluded that the evidence at that point was capable of amounting to the charge we are concerned with. We do not propose to repeat our summary of the evidence contained in that Judgment.
The Appellant gave evidence. He confirmed that he was now 27, but 26 at the time we are concerned with, and that he was of hitherto good character. He described his education and his academic achievements, having obtained 17 GCSE certificates.
Since leaving school he has furthered his education and has been in constant employment, initially with an automotive company, but since 2006 he has worked with a subsidiary company and was promoted to administration and finance supervisor. In recent times he has undertaken tasks with a greater degree of responsibility and told us he would not knowingly risk his job. In consequence of this conviction he was suspended and eventually dismissed.
He described how he met Crazy Colours online and had seen her once prior to these events. He agreed that it was obviously then a relationship in its early stages. It was an important relationship, indeed, he is now living with her.
He accepted he was frustrated by the potential cancellation of, or interference with, his plan to visit Belfast to see her and that his followers would have been aware of the importance to him of his relationship. But he denied that he was prepared to put out a threat.
He accepts that he sent the message in question on the public timeline of Twitter, but says he did not regard it as menacing. He did not intend it to be, nor did he see any risk at all that it would be so regarded. He said that if he had, he would have not sent it.
He described his Twitter usage and agreed he had 690 followers and had sent 1,400 messages over the eleven months that he had been using the site. So far as the messages sent directly to Crazy Colours were concerned earlier that day, he accepted sending those.
In cross-examination, he was asked about his experience of travelling by air and he said that he had not done so for five years, since he was 21, but he did not read the news, save on his news feed and he did not then often watch the television news.
He was asked why he had made references to terrorism in his private messages and he said “I never thought about it”. When asked about whether he expected others to read his message, he said he didn’t think about it and denied that he was showing off, although we note in passing, that in his interview at page 22, he expressed a contrary view.
We pause at this stage to note that his private dialogue, at messages 451 and 454, appeared to us to include others, as can be seen from messages 452 and 453.
He said that the content of the messages to Crazy Colours and those from others, did not stick in his mind, despite the fact, as was put to him, that he only sent 5 tweets at the material time, as we have been informed.
Mr Ferguson repeats and amplifies the three submissions he made to us at an earlier stage of the case and we will deal with these in the same order.
We have already set out in detail the statutory provisions and the interpretation of them by both the Divisional Court and the House of Lords. We remind ourselves obviously of the burden and standard for proof.
We are satisfied, on the evidence, that the message in question is menacing in its content and obviously so. It is difficult to imagine anything more clear. It fits the Oxford English Dictionary definition and the observations of Lord Justice Sedley, to which we have earlier referred. It is, in our judgement, menacing per se.
Although the offence does not require the message to be seen, we take the view that an ordinary person seeing this, and we have no evidence that anyone did, would see it in that way and be alarmed. The airport staff did see it and were sufficiently concerned to report it. As the authorities make it clear, there is no need for anyone to see the message and in any event, different people can have different views.
The required mens rea for this offence is that the person sending the message must have intended the message to be menacing, or be aware that it might be taken to be so.
This Appellant was 26, well-educated and in a responsible job and there is no evidence that he is anything other than of sound mind. We, of course, bear in mind his evidence and the importance of his good character, acknowledging, of course, that good character cannot provide a defence.
We found the Appellant to be an unimpressive witness. We find it impossible to accept that anyone living in this country, in the current climate of terrorist threats, particularly at airports, would not be aware of the consequences of his actions in making such a statement.
Furthermore, we are satisfied that he, as an experienced user of Twitter, made a deliberate decision to post this message on the public timeline of Twitter, on the very day he sent seemingly related private messages to Crazy Colours and within two hours of posting them. We do not accept his evidence that he was unaware of television news and newspaper reports at the material time. His account in interview, as we have observed earlier, was self-serving, although we note that at page 2 of his interview, he uses the expression, when dealing with his Twitter experiences, not to this serious of magnitude.
Accordingly, we are satisfied that the Respondent has proved the necessary mens rea and that the Appellant was, at the very least, aware that his message was of a menacing character.
Finally, in respect of the third matter raised, we repeat our findings on that aspect, made at an earlier stage of this case.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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Sunday, 28 November 2010
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26 comments:
"We find it impossible to accept that anyone living in this country, in the current climate of terrorist threats, particularly at airports, would not be aware of the consequences of his actions in making such a statement."
Actually I think the entire world was stunned by the consequences of this trivial joke, so that assertion rather falls on its face.
Hi Jack,
"His account in interview, as we have observed earlier, was self-serving, although we note that at page 2 of his interview, he uses the expression, when dealing with his Twitter experiences, not to this serious of magnitude."
I don't understand this sentence - is it a typo on your part? If not, and it is the actual wording that they released, could you explain "not to this serious of magniturde"
Thanks.
I find it interesting that the phrase "his message was of a menacing character" is used in the judgement. Perhaps it's just me, but I think that's being 'of a menacing character' is a far stricter test than actually being menacing. I'd consider hyperbolic phrases such as 'come friendly bombs and fall on slough' to be 'of manacing character' but not actually menacing.
She just doesn’t get it does she? Amazing.
There is absolutely no reference to hyperbole, no consideration given whether this would be recognises as hyperbole by an “ordinary person” or would be taken literally.
This is not a judgement at all as it didn’t even consider the central point.
It makes me wonder if she really is unaware of the common use of the language. (OK shoot me for saying something stupid but the answer to this will inevitably be something stupid – maybe she spends he life immersed in contractual English)
Or, and maybe she appreciated hyperbole but doesn't believe it is something an “ordinary person” is capable of appreciating.
I’ve always valued the independence of the judiciary (maybe I was brainwashed) but the question in my mind is how society ensures that Judges actually to their job properly in its interest?
So infuriated, it makes me want to put another £50 in the kitty
Rolo
PS Suzanne I think she might think your opening two words is an attempt at ridicule.
"As the authorities make it clear, there is no need for anyone to see the message and in any event, different people can have different views."
So while it's accepted different people can have different views, yet the judge is adamant anyone and everyone reading the message would only consider it to be of menacing character.
Sweet muscular jesus.
my understanding is that the mens rea or guilty mind had to be proven which it has not it was a joke not a malicious comment which he has denied any accusations that he did make a malicious comment therefore the mens rea has not been proven completely
I'm really unimpressed by the reasoning laid out in the judgement . Seems like there is no attempt to define the nature of the medium and the posting, the context... They just jump past that and make a straight-out assumption that a semi-private Twitter conversation is like a direct message sent to the airport?
I was in the courtroom to hear both days of the Appeal. So here are my thoughts - excerpts from the judgement being presented in italics.
In cross-examination, he was asked about his experience of travelling by air and he said that he had not done so for five years, since he was 21, but he did not read the news, save on his news feed and he did not then often watch the television news.
I never understood where the prosecution was going with this line of questioning, but it's important to note that Paul simply supplied direct answers to the direct questions put to him. How the chap takes his news is up to him - and at no point did he try to claim he was uninformed of current affairs, or (as I suspect they were hoping) try to claim he was unaware of the seriousness of making a terrorism related threat in the "times in which we live".
He was asked why he had made references to terrorism in his private messages and he said “I never thought about it”. When asked about whether he expected others to read his message, he said he didn’t think about it and denied that he was showing off, although we note in passing, that in his interview at page 22, he expressed a contrary view.
I'd like to know PRECISELY what he did say in Page 22 of his interview. I doubt he would have actually claimed to be showing off however, and I would point out that there is a world of difference between trying to use humour as a means of breaking down barriers when forming a relationship, and "look at me - I'm brave enough to threaten an airport.".
He said that the content of the messages to Crazy Colours and those from others, did not stick in his mind, despite the fact, as was put to him, that he only sent 5 tweets at the material time, as we have been informed.
What are they trying to make from this? I'm aware that I've probably sent @CrazyColours three or four direct messages in the past few days. I can't remember what was in them all, because they frankly were not that memorable. Now the first Paul himself heard of the case against against him was a week after the offending tweet. It hardly stretches the bounds of reasonable belief that he might not be able to recall what was said.
We are satisfied, on the evidence, that the message in question is menacing in its content and obviously so. It is difficult to imagine anything more clear. It fits the Oxford English Dictionary definition and the observations of Lord Justice Sedley, to which we have earlier referred. It is, in our judgement, menacing per se.
Difficult to imagine anything more clear? Really? Thousands of us who took part in the #IAmSparacus campaign beg to differ. The "Crap" at the front of the message gives a lot away, as does the fact that the supposed threat gives "a week and a bit" to, shall we say, sort the issues out. The Airport has no control over the weather, and therefore no means to comply with Paul's supposed demands.
When all this is taken into account, I think this has to be seen as clearly having been intended as a joke - and indeed no more menacing than "If you don't start putting your dirty socks in the laundry basket dear, I'll bloody kill you!"
So, while I have to believe that the judge did her best to judge the comment, I personally am left with the impression that she is out of touch with modern society, the language that many of us use, and the meanings conveyed by it.
Although the offence does not require the message to be seen, we take the view that an ordinary person seeing this, and we have no evidence that anyone did, would see it in that way and be alarmed.
Plenty of ordinary people saw the message - 689 of Paul's normal followers, and one special one - @CrazyColours. Noone reports it as a threat, and @CrazyColours sets up home with the guy. *I* saw it as a joke, does this mean I am not an ordinary person your Honour?
The airport staff did see it and were sufficiently concerned to report it.
The original member of staff to see the tweet was Mr. Duffield, the airport duty manager - when he was using Twitter from home. As he explained, he does not have the liberty to decide how to react under these circumstances - if something *could* be a threat, no matter how unlikely, he is obliged to report it.
It is, in my view, therefore ridiculous to claim that he was "sufficient concerned". He was, rightly unfortunately, simply following orders.
The required mens rea for this offence is that the person sending the message must have intended the message to be menacing, or be aware that it might be taken to be so.
Indeed - and in order for the court to convict, they have to be sure of this "Beyond reasonable doubt". Well, as I said, I was in court for this. To my mind, there was no way they could even form a reasonable suspicion that he intended this as a threat, or considered that it might be interpreted as such. How the court managed to convict, bearing this in mind, is I fear beyond my capacity to understand.
We found the Appellant to be an unimpressive witness.
It's difficult to really form on opinion on this statement without also having the context as to why. For my money, Paul stood before the court, gave his evidence clearly and honestly, and not once gave me any reason to think he might be trying to mislead anyone. I thought came across very well on the stand, and I even told him so BEFORE we went back in for the verdict.
We found the Appellant to be an unimpressive witness. We find it impossible to accept that anyone living in this country, in the current climate of terrorist threats, particularly at airports, would not be aware of the consequences of his actions in making such a statement.
Only he didn't consider that he was posting to the general public - he had a specific audience (his followers). I truly believe it never occured to him that someone might find this tweet by using the search facilty of Twitter. He didn't consider that any of his followers would find the message menacing, and he was demonstrably correct, because none of them did.
Furthermore, we are satisfied that he, as an experienced user of Twitter, made a deliberate decision to post this message on the public timeline of Twitter, on the very day he sent seemingly related private messages to Crazy Colours and within two hours of posting them.
He may well have intended for the message to go to the public timeline, but that doesn't mean that the message is published to the public at large - only his followers should have seen it. True, messages can be searched, but I truly believe that this did not occur to Paul when he sent the message. I don't even think he thought about this at all - it was just a jokey comment to his followers - and we've all done that.
We do not accept his evidence that he was unaware of television news and newspaper reports at the material time.
Does the actual medium by which one gets their news really matter? Paul didn't claim to live isolated from world events - he even volunteered that he read the news - and specially mentioned RSS Feeds. If the jusge didn't understand what an RSS feed is, then she should have asked.
His account in interview, as we have observed earlier, was self-serving, although we note that at page 2 of his interview, he uses the expression, when dealing with his Twitter experiences, not to this serious of magnitude.
Of course his account was self serving - it's the account of an innocent man! As forthe rest of the sentence, I don't see where she is going with that - I just don't understand it.
Accordingly, we are satisfied that the Respondent has proved the necessary mens rea and that the Appellant was, at the very least, aware that his message was of a menacing character.
Well, as someone who was, as I say, sat in the court, I have absolutely no idea how you came to that conclusion.
===================================
I went to court that day expecting to see justice done, but I came away with a very bitter aftertaste. My personal opinion is that I witnessed a mis-carriage of justice.
We'll now have to wait for the case before the High Court - and I don't know when that will be heard. In the meantime, it's important that the "internet community" continue to support Paul. It quite literally could have been any of us.
Martin.
Ps. Anyone who wants to read more on the case should look here:
http://cripesonfriday.tumblr.com/post/606531386/paul-chambers-related-links-in-one-post
Note the Donate button on the left hand side...
Good point by Andrew Robinson. The Mastermind theme is of a menacing character. In fact, it's called "Approaching Menace". Are we expecting the composer in the dock any time soon?
"The required mens rea for this offence is that the person sending the message must have intended the message to be menacing, or be aware that it might be taken to be so."
Dear Jack, can you explain the latter part to me (apologies if you have already done so in previous posts). I see references to the Divisional Court and the House of Lords, could we have those judgments (I find it strange that the judgment here does not contain the references already)?
My problem with 'be aware...." is that it seems to suggest that the more intelligent/aware you are, the more you are at risk of being carted off to jail> If, say, for example, I were to say something idiomatic about a particular religion (say: "the FSM is cooked!"), which most of my acquaintances agree with, the majority of everyday people might be none the wiser about, but I might know (maybe because of media information on that point, or because I have read extensively on that point and in particular the very supersensitivity of the adherents to such religion is one of the reasons for my outburst) that someone, somewhere in the whole world would feel aggrieved as if I'd just cut off their little finger, or threatened to burn down their idol or something similar, I'd be carted off to jail? If on the other hand I know nothing of how sensitive or commonsensical the adherents are (didn't even know it was a religion), I'm safe because I'm not "aware" that someone etc etc etc? Surely that can't be right!
(ps: I do not know the intricacies of the FSM religion and have no intention to offend or menace or be obscene to anyone about it!)
If this was fiction the plot would be rejected as "unbelievable".
It's difficult to reconcile the tweet being menacing "per se" with it being found to be menacing "on the evidence".
If it is menacing per se then there need be no evidence: the tweet itself is intrinsically menacing and outside matters are irrelevant. I don't believe that the tweet is menacing per se in any meaningful use of the word per se. The judge was using the concept of per se to cut off debate. I think the "on the evidence" is a diversionary tactic (perhaps subconscious) to make it seem that she wasn't saying "it's menacing. 'Cos it is. And stop arguing about it".
It would be very interesting to get the judge in the High Court and grill her on just what evidence the judgement that the tweet was menacing was based on.
The OED is behind a paywall. So I cannot check the OED definition. The tweet did not, however, conform to the Chambers definition of "menance":
noun
1 a source of threatening danger.
2 a threat; a show of hostility.
There was no threat, that seems agreed by all. "A show of hostility" depends, naturally, on what you mean be "hostility". Did Paul show himself to be "hostile" to Robin Hood Airport? Perhaps, but no more hostile than someone tweeting "Airport x is terrible. The management are obviously idiots".
3 colloq something or someone that is very annoying or troublesome.
Is obviously not what the law is getting at.
verb (menaced, menacing) tr & intr to threaten; to show an intention to damage or harm someone.
This requires a mens rea for damage or harm! You can't "show an intention to" without "intending to"! The tweet cannot possibly have been menacing in this sense.
So much has been said about this case and covered in so many interesting ways, but to my mind there are three things that stand out about this judgment which indicate to me, at least, that contemporary law is lagging behind in the world in which we live (which I suppose may be viewed as ironic, given that the judge believes he is very much in tune with our world):
The first really just relates to semantics, as many have observed. Lexicon and its context creates a sophisticated combination which has to be understood not only in the time in which it is written but also in light of the operating culture in which it seeks to make itself known. The judgment doesn’t seem to take any of this into account, save for the fact that terrorism is a current topic. But I would argue that in itself is not enough of a threshold to take a view such as the one the judge decided to take. It is only a fraction of the semantic story.
This brings me to the second point. Users of twitter have by and large adopted an informal and relaxed style of communication. Those who tweet in earnest are usually spambots or salesmen. The rest of us observe certain customs, customs one can only be familiar with if one uses social media in general or more specifically, twitter. It occurs to me that the judge is probably not a social media user. If he were, I suspect his judgment would have been quite different. Tweets are also fleeting sentiments by definition: earnest tweeters aside, who may re-iterate similar sentiments daily to get their message across, most twitter users are simply scribes of fugitive emotion; tweeted one minute, gone the next. As the tweet stream is in constant movement, thoughts and feelings get washed away in a matter of moments, as we add more thoughts along with the many other users who do the same. I would modestly suggest then, that the judge should have taken into account the unique nature of the offending tweet, as combined with Mr Chambers’ good character and obvious non-affiliation to terrorist organisations. There should have been a closer inspection of the overall picture in which the comment was made as well as the potential message a conviction would send out.
The third and final point then relates to judicial responsibility. In this case, to my mind, the judge had a responsibility to look at the bigger picture, not least of all because the case was of public interest and therefore in the spotlight. By convicting a man of a crime that he did not intend to commit (regardless of the wonky reasoning in the judgment that says otherwise) this judge has failed to see the importance of containing political tension. Terrorism can only be successful if we allow it to pervade society and to motivate our thinking in a way that jeopardises our freedom. This judge has allowed that to happen. This man clearly did not intend to blow up an airport any more than he intended others to do so, on his behalf. It’s great that the airport staff were cautious, but once investigated, the matter should have been laid to rest. This was a great opportunity for our judiciary to send out an extremely important political message: we take terrorism seriously, but we will not allow it to dictate the terms upon which we value our freedoms.
In essence, this judgment is a victory for extremists everywhere. Let’s hope that we don’t make a habit (pun intended) of letting fear win over reason.
@Martin Milan I think the "showing off" aspect Paul showing off to Crazycolours the lengths he would go to in order to get over to her.
Certainly I have used the twitter timeline to emphasise some joke I have made in DMs, it's something that makes sense to followers but is really only directed at one person.
Paul was telling Crazycolours he wanted to be there and was showing how much it meant to him, it was a grand gesture.
I wrote about his in my blog Paul Lassos The Moon http://bit.ly/dqOEzu where there is also a donation button if people are so inclined.
We are satisfied, on the evidence, that the message in question is menacing in its content and obviously so. It is difficult to imagine anything more clear.
What disingenous and disgusting hyperbole! It is simple to imagine a more clearly menacing message.
Accordingly, we are satisfied that the Respondent has proved the necessary mens rea and that the Appellant was, at the very least, aware that his message was of a menacing character.
That's not actually the test the judge laid out for herself. The actual test was:
The required mens rea for this offence is that the person sending the message must have intended the message to be menacing, or be aware that it might be taken to be so.
Whether or not Paul was aware that his message was menacing, I think it's evident that Paul considered his message to be of a flippant character, believed that its flippant character would prevent anyone taking it to be menacing, and was thus unaware.
One rather simple question continues to bother me.
If the message is menacing what was the menace? Presumably that the reader believed Paul Chambers might actually blow up the airport.
However the justice process itself decided that a prosecution could not be successfully brought under the law normally used for bomb hoaxes.
In that case, if this was not a bomb hoax, how could it be threatening?
Presumable there is a technical answer to this question. I would love to understand it.
There are so many laws thesedays that crimilise speach it is hard to keep track of them, particularly as in general they are so poorly defined. As well as this case there is somebody being charged with religious hatred for positing a video of herself burning a book. I am sure we are going to see many more cases of otherwise law abiding people being penalised for a single action or statement , that while possibly very stupid harms nobody.
As a couple of commenters have already noted, the judge is trying to have it both ways: she says that the message was menacing whether or not anyone saw it, but relies on the assertion that the message *would* menace anyone who read it:
(1) She asserts that the appeal should be rejected because the message was 'menacing per se and clearly so', even though no evidence has ever been presented to indicate that anyone who saw it on Twitter (during the 6 days before anyone at the airport actually acted on it) decided, on the basis of the message, not to go to Robin Hood Airport.
(2) On the other hand, she says that there is no need to show that anyone was menaced by the message in order to uphold the original conviction. This seems to me to be a dangerous basis on which to give her ruling, particularly as she relies so heavily on 'what an ordinary person would understand by the message'. After all, an ordinary person would presumably understand "to menace" as a transitive verb: it's something you do *to* somebody.
If I stomp about in an empty room, waving my arms and shouting angrily, I'm not menacing anyone - and yet by her definition I would be guilty, because "the offence does not require the message to be seen".
The appeal judgement proves nothing more than that Paul Chambers' conviction rests on conjecture. Disgraceful.
For what it is worth, the OED defines "menacing" (adjective) as follows: "That menaces or threatens; threatening."
This is the sort of case that brings the law and the justice system into disrepute. There was no "threat" - it was not possible to bring a prosecution for making a bomb hoax - so how can this message be "threatening" in any meaningful sense?
"We are satisfied, on the evidence, that the message in question is menacing in its content and obviously so. It is difficult to imagine anything more clear. It fits the Oxford English Dictionary definition and the observations of Lord Justice Sedley, to which we have earlier referred."
This is troubling. "Menacing" is an adjective that does not have an objective definition at all. In fact, "menacing" is definitely a subjective term.
What is perhaps even more troubling than the Judge completely misunderstanding the word is that they seem so very sure that it was a menacing communication, when it clearly wasn't intended to be so and would not be taken as such by any reasonable human being.
"It is difficult to imagine anything more clear."
This is terrifying. That someone entrusted with so much legal power can miss the point and be so completely and utterly wrong is very unsettling indeed.
Although the offence does not require the message to be seen, we take the view that an ordinary person seeing this, and we have no evidence that anyone did, would see it in that way and be alarmed.
I did not find the message in any way alarming. Does that mean I'm not ordinary? I feel quite insulted by this.
We find it impossible to accept that anyone living in this country, in the current climate of terrorist threats, particularly at airports, would not be aware of the consequences of his actions in making such a statement.
I am 25, well-educated and in a responsible job. I can honestly say I would not have expected Paul's actions to have any such consequences.
I too have made comments that under this interpretation of the law would probably get me arrested. Probably most of the under-30s population of the UK are in the same boat. Are we all criminals, or just the ones that the CPS bothers to prosecute?
What it boils down to is this: if someone were actually threatening to blow up an airport, they wouldn't announce it on Twitter, they wouldn't announce it under their real name, and they'd actually bother to let the airport know. They would also not threaten to blow up the entire airport as this is unrealistic (taken as a whole, airports are quite large and sparsely populated).
I contend that an "ordinary person" would grasp all this intuitively. But then according to the judge I'm not ordinary, so what would I know? >:-(
We are satisfied, on the evidence, that the message in question is menacing in its content and obviously so. It is difficult to imagine anything more clear.
Good grief an argument from personal incredulity as judicial judgement. Considering the judge has evidence in the online and generally public sphere that plenty of other people can imagine clearer examples the use of this is just jaw droppingly appalling.
Perhaps I am being naive and judges make arguments from personal incredulity all the time. If this is true it shouldn't be. Arguments from personal incredulity are a well known logical fallacy which speak only to the state of mind of the arguer. They have no bearing whatsoever on the nature of outside reality.
The only way I can square the circle of this not also being treated a bomb hoax is that the word 'hoax' implies that there is actually no bomb. Presumably the prosecutors were expecting the defendant to prove innocence of the hoax charge by introducing a bomb as evidence? In my opinion this would not be more absurd than some of the other reasoning applied in this case!
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